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CHAPTER I
THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
When the authors of the Constitution of the United States de-
vised a bicameral legislative system for the new government, they made
no provision for settling differences between the two branches of
Congress. Early in the history of Congress, however, it became appar-
ent that some device was necessary in order to resolve differences of
opinion between the House of Representatives and the Senate.
It is not unreasonable to expect that disagreement will arise
in a bicameral legislative system. With the two chambers of the legis-
lature representing different types of interests and constituencies,
with one chamber based roughly on population and the other on state
sovereignty, and with one chamber more than four times the size of the
other, disagreement becomes an even more reasonable expectation. In
the American legislative system, however, the two chambers of the leg-
islature are relatively equal in power. Therefore, coercion by a
stronger chamber is not ordinarily possible. It has then evolved that
two relatively equal branches of the legislature should settle their
differences by discussing them. From this necessity came a reasonable
solution, the conference committee, a device created to compromise the
differences between the two chambers of the American legislature.
1
2A. Scope of the Paper
The main purpose of this paper Is to examine the role of the
conference committee In the legislative process. In order to do this
I have selected five specific Congressional acts; 1. e., the Trade
Agreements Extension Acts of 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1958 and the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. These Acts were picked for this study for the
following reasons:
1. Reciprocal trade legislation has been a continuing political
issue for many years in the United States.
2. Trade legislation and tariff rates have been highly partisan
issues for many years.
3. The two committees of Congress which handle trade legislation,
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, are generally considered to be among the most powerful
and prestigious committees in Congress.
4. Reciprocal trade legislation represents a continuing issue
which the Congress has had to deal with at regular intervals
for nearly thirty years.
5. The acts mentioned above represent the five most recent trade
acts that were taken to conference committee.
In examining these acts I have attempted to analyze them in
order to answer certain specific questions about them. In eacn in-
stance I have tried to determine the role of the conference committee.
I have attempted to discover whether the conference committee was
truly a compromise making body, or whether at times it became concerned
3with making decisions on legislative matters and in fact wrote new
legislation. I have attempted to measure the relative strength of
the House of Representatives versus the Senate within the conference
committee. Then I have examined the individual conferees in order to
trace their importance and position within the conference. Finally,
I have attempted to determine how well the conferees represent the
feelings of their respective chambers, their political parties, and
their standing committees.
In a somewhat different vein I have attempted to determine the
relative importance of the President and the administration in deter-
mining final conference results. In certain instances it has been
difficult, due to a lack of sufficient information, to arrive at an
adequate conclusion on these matters. The secrecy of conference com-
mittee proceedings has left a great many unanswered questions concern-
ing the operations of this legislative institution.
B. Appointment of a Conference Committee
The conference committee is actually a joint committee of the
House and the Senate. A new conference committee is created whenever
one house refuses to agree to the version of a bill or resolution as
passed by the other house. The committee is usually made up of from
three to nine members of each house. The Speaker of the House has
appointed House conferees since 1890. The Senate President (Vice-
President) has traditionally appointed Senate Conferees.
1
^da C. MeCown, The Congressional Conference Committee (New
York, 1927).
4Both the Speaker and the Senate President are limited by
custom in their choice of conferees, however. Except in very unusual
situations the chairman of the committee which has handled the bill in
each chamber heads his chamber's delegation. Other members are chosen
by selecting in order the ranking majority and minority members of the
committee. In actual practice the conferees are usually named from a
list presented to the presiding officer by the floor manager of the
bill after he has consulted with the majority and minority leaders.
C. Procedure in Seeking a Conference
The decision as to whether to seek a conference is of vital
importance to Congressional leaders. However, almost all important
pieces of legislation eventually go to conference. Gross maintains
that the realization that a conference committee will eventually be
appointed creates a natural tendency to postpone serious conflict and
2
to pass the buck to the conference committee. And it appears true
that Congressmen will often fail to try to amend legislation on the
floor if they feel that they can win their point in conference.
The conference stage is actually reached when a disagreement
is formally stated by either house. This disagreement will usually
occur when the second house has amended a bill and returned it to t^e
house of origin which in turn refuses to accept the amendments.
Quite frequently, however, the second house will assume that the
^Bertram M. Gross, The Legislative Struggle (New York, 1953),
p. 318.
5house of origin will refuse to accept the changes and will vote to
insist on them and to request a conference. 3
There are actually two possible reasons for one chamber re-
questing a conference before the other chamber acts on its amendments.
One reason is to speed the process of the conference, when a confer-
ence is quite obviously inevitable; the other is for strategic
reasons. The chamber which asks for the conference has the last say
on the conference report; i. e., the other chamber must debate and
vote on the report first.
In like manner one chamber may prevent a bill from going to
conference committee because there is no time for conference action or
because the apparent makeup of a conference will produce undesirable
conference results. If either of these possibilities seems distinctly
possible. Congressmen will often go to great lengths to avoid sending
a bill to conference committee.
D. Procedure in the Conference
The senior appointed Senator of the majority party usually
serves as chairman of the conference committee. The number of con-
ferees from each house is not necessarily equal since the conferees of
each house vote as a unit. A majority vote of the members of either
house determines the position of that house, and therefore a majority
of conferees of each house is necessary in order to obtain approval
of each measure and subsequently for the approval of the final report.
^Gilbert Steiner, The Congressional Conference Committee
(Urbana, 111., 1951), p. 7.
6This makes the selection of the number of conferees a strategic deci-
sion for party leaders as It gives them their only real leverage In
determining final conference results.
A manipulation of conference committee members can occasion-
ally give party leaders an opportunity to deviate from strict adher-
ence to the seniority system. The most common representation on a
conference committee Is three members from each house, two from the
majority and one from the minority. Occasionally, however, by In-
creasing the representation of one house to five or seven members, a
majority leader can present to the presiding officer a committee member-
ship more acceptable to the party leadership.
Both parties are represented on the conference committee, with
the majority party having the larger number of conferees (usually one
from each chamber more than the minority). However, i.s a majority of
conferees from both houses must sign the eventual report, the minority
party members often play a key role in the proceedings. All proceed-
ings of the conference are kept secret, generally for the purpose of
protecting conferees from outside pressures.
E. Congressional Control of the Conference
In theory, conference committees are not permitted to write
new legislation. This rule is occasionally by-passed when new lan-
guage is necessary in order to make the bill acceptable to each house.
One of the purposes of these case studies, however, is to examine
whether or not conference committees do go outside their parliamentary
prerogatives by writing new legislation. Each house has rules wuereby
7conference reports are subject to a point of order if new material is
included in the final bill.^
The primary purpose of the conference, however, is to recon*
cile the differences of the Senate and the House. Supposedly con-
ferees will grant only those concessions which tlieir house will agree
to accept. Conferees either recede from or concur with the amend-
ments of the other house. On occasion an impasse will develop in
which conferees will not be able to agree upon a certain provision.
Then the conferees will either go back to their respective chambers
for a vote on the matter or will allow the bill to die in conference.
When a majority of the conferees of both houses finally reach
an agreement, they prepare a conference report, explaining what they
did and why they did it. These reports are always printed in the
House. An oral explanation is often made by one of the conferees in
the Senate. Conference reports are privileged matters in both the
House and the Senate and can be called up on the floor as soon as
they are filed.
^
A conference report cannot be amended when it is brought up
for final consideration. Likewise it cannot be referred to a stand-
ing committee or to the House Committee of the whole. The report
must be adopted or rejected in its entirety. Rejection of a report
is usually followed by the ordering of another conference, if time
Congressional Quarterly Fact Sheet, Congressional Quarterly
Weekly , Hay 1, 1959, p. 597.
5Op , cit .. Congressional Quarterly Weekly .
8allows. By custom the same conferees are named to the second confer-
ence committee.
Conference reports can only be amended by concurrent resolu-
tion and this is usually reserved for a technical change. Partial
reports will be accepted in both chambers at times. In such a case
each house may indicate what position it wishes its conferees to take
on the undetermined portion of the bill. 6
P. Dissatisfaction with the Conference System
As the conference system is controlled by the most senior
members of Congress and as conference proceedings are often so impor-
tant, there has often been a great deal of dissatisfaction with the
actions of various conference committees. Though it is generally con-
ceded that nothing can be deleted in conference that has previously
been agreed upon by both houses, there have been serious objections
to selecting members of conference committees strictly by seniority.
As previously stated, this often produces conferees who are not at
all in agreement with the general wishes of their house.
In 1958, Senator Joseph S. Clark (D-Pa.) unsuccessfully pro-
posed a Senate resolution by which he would require that a majority
of Senate conferees ’’must have indicated by their votes their sympathy
with the bill as passed and their concurrence in the prevailing opin-
ion of the Senate on matters of disagreement with the House" on
6Steiner, p. 11.
9matters which are subject to conference committee action. 7 Senator
Clark has unsuccessfully proposed this resolution in each Congress
since 1958, but he has never received a hearing in the Senate Rules
Committee on the resolution.
Taking a clue from this resolution, this paper will attempt
to examine the action of conferees in an attempt to see how well they
do represent the prevailing opinion of their respective houses and
also how well they represent their standing committees.
G. Summary
This chapter has attempted to present the focal point for
observing conference committee action. I have presented the leglsla-
tion to be studied and the reasons for studying it. In addition to
this I have noted important points of focus, namely conference com-
mittee appointment, procedural matters in seeking and in carrying out
a conference. Congressional control over the conference and dissatis-
faction with the conference system
It should be noted at the outset of this paper that the sample
on which this study is based is necessarily restricted in size and
scope. Congress deals with literally hundreds of conference reports
each session, and each of these conference reports is written by a
different committee using differing methodology and reaching their
conclusions in different ways. This study is only meant to suggest
7Op. cit . , Congressional Quarterly Weekly .
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the results of conference committees dealing with reciprocal trade
legislation and representing the two standing committees involved.
It is hoped that some insight can be gained from this study into the
overall problem of conference committee behavior.
CHAPTER II
RECIPROCAL TRADE LEGISLATION
One of the express powers of the United States Congress as
stated In Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution is to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations." For years the question of tariff
policy has played an important role in American politics, and the bat-
tles between the "free traders" and the "protectionists" raged in
Congress and on the campaign trails. Since the substantive area of
research in this paper is reciprocal trade legislation, it seems rea-
sonable to examine the history of reciprocal trade before going on to
the actual case studies.
In 1930, the Republican 71st Congress revised the tariff
rates and classifications of the United States for the last time in
an act known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. This 1930 act, which re-
flected the protectionist bias of the majority of Republicans, raised
tariff duties to an all-time high. It was felt that the Smoot-Hawley
tariff would assure the return of domestic prosperity to the United
States during a period of world-wide depression.
History has shown that the tariff of 1930 was unsuccessful in
accomplishing its objective, and the Republican tariff policy became
an issue of some importance in the presidential campaign of 1932.
Yet despite his huge election margin in 1932, President
Franklin
11
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Roosevelt found that it was not easy for the Chief Executive to change
an American tariff policy which was dependent on Congressional stat-
ute. The Executive branch would have to negotiate treaties which
could only go into effect upon the approval of two-thirds of the
United States Senate* Under these conditions most foreign nations
were extremely reluctant to even discuss tariff change with the
United States (the Senate-Wilson fiasco over the Treaty of Versailles
had never been forgotten in other parts of the world).
One of the primary advocates of liberal tariff policy in this
country was the new Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Hull had
fought Republican protectionists vigorously while he was a member of
the House of Representatives, and he was determined to bring about a
change in tariff policy under the new administration. With great
effort, Hull persuaded Congress to adopt the Trade Agreements Act of
1934. Despite huge Democratic majorities in both chambers, the Con-
gress was loath to give to the executive one of its most cherished
political privileges.
However, public reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff had been
adverse, and under the strong leadership of Roosevelt, Hull, and the
Democratic leadership in Congress, the act was passed. The main pur-
pose of the act was to permit the Executive to negotiate reciprocal
reductions in tariffs with foreign nations.®
®March 20, 1934—House of Representatives, 274-111
June 4, 1934—Senate, 57-33.
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The new act, an amendment to the Smoot-Hawley act, gave the
President the power to reduce tariff rates by as much as 50 percent
In exchange for similar reductions by other nations. The Smoot-
Hawley rates were to serve as maximum rates under the act.
At the same time, the Congress did place certain specific
limitations on the President's power to act. Although the main pur-
pose of the new act was to increase our exports, action was to be
slow and cautious. The President was forbidden to transfer items
from the so-called "duty list" to the "free list." While the reduc-
tions in tariff were intended to apply to all nations who did not
discriminate against us, the preferential Cuban treaty of 1902 was to
be left untouched. This treaty, signed at the granting of independ-
ence to Cuba, granted special concessions to the Cuban government.
The President was also instructed in the act to notify all
affected persons before negotiating a treaty, and all such persons
were to be given a chance to present their views. The President was
also to seek the advice of a number of sources before making an
agreement, including a special Tariff Commission, certain cabinet
members, and other "appropriate sources." The President was prohib-
ited from negotiating foreign debts. And finally the act was to ex-
pire in three years, which definitely limited the bargaining power of
the Executive.
—
^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull , Vol. I (New York,
1948), p. 352.
i
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Roosevelt applied for extensions of the Tariff Act in 1937,
1940, and 1943, and the basic authority of the act was extended in
each instance. However, by 1945 agreements had been signed with 27
separate nations and much of the original authority to reduce tariff
had been exhausted. Because of this the President requested further
power to reduce rates up to 50 percent, using the rates effective in
1945 as a base. 10 Congress granted him this power. As a result of
the 1945 act, the President was able to negotiate agreements with 22
other countries. The United States also entered into a multilateral
conference at Geneva, Switzerland, which produced the General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (commonly referred to as GATT)
,
and which
remain in effect. As of 1963, 40 countries had signed the GATT
agreements, but the creation of the European Common Market has
greatly reduced their potential and impact.
After 1945, however, most of the amendments to the tariff act
extensions were in the form of restrictions on the executive power.
In 1942 the administration proposed an "escape clause" in an agree-
ment with Mexico. The terras of the "escape clause" were that either
party could modify concessions if increased imports threatened to
injure domestic production. By 1943, due to Congressional prodding,
the administration informally agreed in a gentlemen's agreement to
include "escape clauses" in all subsequent tariff agreements.
11
1Congressional Quarterly Almanac—1958 (Washington, 1958)
,
p. 166.
11Howard S. Piquet, The Trade Agreements Act and National
Interest (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1958), p. 16.
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In 1948, the Republican 80th Congress was successful In enact-
ing the first formal restriction of Presidential powers in the "peril
point" provision. This provision stated that the President must fur-
nish the Tariff Conmiseion with a list of all proposed tariff conces-
sions, and the commission was to specify the rates of duty below which
tariffs could not be lowered without injuring domestic producers. The
commission’s findings were advisory only and not binding on the Presi-
dent. The peril point provision was dropped in a 1949 extension but
was added again in the 1951 act (one of those investigated here).
The escape clause was also formally written into the act in 1951,
therefore making meaningful reduction more difficult after 1951. 12
After the Republican victory in 1952, the trade agreements act
came up again in 1953, facing for the first time both a Republican
Congress and a Republican President. This Congress, however, merely
extended the act intact for one year (to 1954) and established the
famous Randall Commission which was to report to the nation on tariff
policy the next year.
The Randall Commission proved to be a disappointment to the
protectionist-minded Republicans, for it recommended the following:
1. Reduction of general tariff rates by 5 percent a year below
1955 levels.
The President be granted the right to lower tariffs up to
50 percent on unimportant items of trade.
12Ibid
.
2 .
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3. The continued lowering of tariffs to 50 percent 'ad valorum'
if the tariff rates were higher than said 50 percent, through
international agreement.
Due to election year pressure, the Republican leadership, in order
to prevent a party fight, ignored the findings and asked for an
extension of the act without change to 1955.
In 1955, with the Democrats back in control of Congress, the
President requested a three-year extension, generally adopting the
modest proposals of the Randall Commission. The extension was granted
after a bitter Congressional controversy, but only after two more
restrictions were added. One of these was the so-called "national
security" amendment and the other was designed to strengthen the
above mentioned escape clause.
The original act came up one more time for extension in 1958
when the Democrats were firmly in control of Congress. President
Eisenhower requested a five-year extension of the agreements with
further power to reduce tariffs. The House adopted the President's
request almost in total, but the Senate adopted only a three-year
bill with a reduced power of reduction far less than the President
requested. The Congress also added, for the first time, a provision
giving Congress the power to enforce acceptance of Tariff Commission
findings on the President by a two-thirds vote if he ignored the com-
mission's reports. In the end a four-year extension with limited
^Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 1958, p. 166.
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powers of reduction was granted, but the Congressional veto was main-
tained. This will be examined In detail In the study of the 1958
bill.
The most recent piece of trade legislation was the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962. Unlike the other cases examined this bill was
not a modification and extension of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934
but was a completely new bill with certain new approaches to world
trade problems. One of the main advantages of the new act was that
It made permanent all changes made In the 1958 extension, while the
previous extension bills were merely temporary modifications of the
1934 bill. 14
The Trade Expansion Act gave the President a five-year author-
ity, lasting until July 1, 1967, to cut existing tariffs, generally
by 50 percent, to eliminate tariffs on certain categories of goods
between the United States and the European Common Market, and to
bargain with other nations on many other types of world trade. Much
of the bargaining authority, however, was based on the condition that
Great Britain be admitted to the Common Market. The bill also elim-
inated the old peril point requirement and provided for trade adjust-
ment assistance, the most controversial part of the bill.
Cases in Point
The specific cases used in this paper are the Tariff Exten-
sion Acts of 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1958 and the Trade Expansion Act
^Congressional Quarterly Special Report, The Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (Washington, D. C., 1962), pp. 1-2.
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of 1962. These acts provide the basis for an examination of the five
most recent acts on reciprocal trade which went to conference com-
mittee. The 1954 act, passed in the waning days of the 83rd Congress,
did not see conference action. These bills provide an interesting
insight due to differing partisan divisions of the executive and
legislative branches of government. The 1951 act was passed under a
Democratic President and a Democratic Congress, the 1953 act under a
Republican President and a Republican Congress, the 1955 and 1958 acta
under a Republican President and a Democratic Congress (Democratic in
differing degrees), and finally the 1962 act under a new Democratic
President and a Democratic Congress.
CHAPTER III
TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT—1951
During the 1948 election. President Truman made an issue of
the restrictive peril point amendment which the 80th Congress had
added to the reciprocal trade program. Therefore, one of the first
acts of the 81st Congress was a two-year extension of the program
without this amendment.
However, when the time for extension came up again during the
heat of the Korean War in 1951, the trade atmosphere had changed con-
siderably. The President asked for an extension of three years with
no restrictive amendments added. However, a minority of Democrats
joined with an almost solid bloc of Republicans in questioning
whether the trade program should continue unchanged.
The program was called up before the Ways and Means Committee
of the House, and a Republican resolution to restore the so-called
’’peril point’* provision was soundly beaten. A number of similar
amendments were also defeated. On the floor, however, the Republi-
cans were able to get the "peril point” amendment reinserted into the
bill. A coalition of 42 Democrats joined with 183 Republicans to
amend the bill.
When the protectionists found themselves in command in the
House, they proposed additional amendments which barred tariff
19
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concessions to the Communist bloc and also spelled out a method of
'redress' for American industries injured by tariff concessions.
T ie amendments were adopted and the bill was sent to the Senate where
the Republicans hoped to insert more protective restrictions on the
President's power.
After extensive hearings, the Finance Committee unanimously
approved a bill on April 26, 1951, which was markedly different from
the bill as passed by the House. The bill provided for a two-year
extension instead of three years, the "peril point" provision in a
slightly different form, a provision barring trade concessions to
the Communist bloc, and a number of amendments prohibiting various
classes of agricultural importing.
Despite these limitations on the scope of the tariff bill a
small but vocal minority led by Senator George Malone fought any kind
of extension. One important floor amendment was added by Senator
McCarthy of Wisconsin which restricted imports of certain furs to
25 percent of domestic production. It was adopted by a voice vote.
The final bill was passed on Miy 23 by an overwhelming margin of 72-2,
and the Senate Insisted on its amendments and called for a conference.
In final passage the bill had the support of a number of Republicans
who had consistently voted against earlier extensions of the act
in less restricted form. 15
1951).
1Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 1951 (Washington,
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The Senate named the chairman of the Finance comaittee and
the two ranking Democrats and two ranking Republicans as its con-
ferees. They were:
George (D-Ga.) Millikin (R-Col.)
Connally (D-Tex.) Taft (R-Ohio)
Byrd (D-Va.)
The House named the chairman of the Ways and Means Conmittee,
the three ranking Democrats and the first, third and fourth ranking
Republicans as its conferees, as follows:
Doughton (D-N.C.) Reed (R-N.Y.)
Cooper (D-Tenn.) Jenkins (R-Ohio)
Dingell (D-Mich.) Simpson (R-Pa.)
Mills (D-Ark.)
The conferees met for a brief period and completed their
work on May 28th. The report contained the following provisions:
1. The extension was for two years as in the Senate bill instead
of three years as in the House bill. House recedes.
2. The House had adopted an amendment which prohibited the
participation of the Tariff Commission in negotiations on
specific trade agreements. The Senate deleted this amend-
ment and the amendment was struck out in conference. House
recedes
.
3. The House adopted an amendment which required the President
to withdraw or prevent application of any trade concessions
to the Coranunist bloc within 90 days. The Senate version
22
included an identical requirement, but with no time limit.
The Senate version also gave the President the right to sus-
pend all concessions to Communist countries at his discre-
tion. The Senate version was accepted. House recedes.
4. The Senate had modified the House version of the compulsory
’escape clause” in an effort to clarify the duties of the
Tariff Commission in making rulings under the clause. The
Senate version was accepted. House recedes.
5. The House had added an amendment which provided that no con-
cessions should apply to any agricultural commodity for which
price supports were available. The Senate adopted, instead,
an amendment which said that no trade agreement should be
adopted which was Inconsistent with Section 22 of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act. The Senate version was adopted with
the addition of a clause stating that the maximum time for
hearings and reports under said clause should be 25 days.
House recedes.
6. A Senate amendment was accepted which restored the right of a
domestic producer to appeal to customs court if he felt he
was injured by an undesired tariff concession. This right was
terminated by the original act of 1934. House recedes.
7. A Senate amendment was accepted which stated that enactment
of this bill was not to be construed as approval or dis-
approval of the Congress of the General Agreements on Tariff
and Trade (GATT). House recedes.
23
8. The Senate had added a floor amendment by Senator Joseph
McCarthy (R>Wls.) which provided relief for the domestic fur
industry by imposing a quota of 25 percent of the domestic
production during the preceding year upon imports of mink,
silver fox, and muskrat furs and skins. The House receded
and the conferees added the following new wording to the
amendment: "The President shall, as soon as practicable,
take such measures as may be necessary to prevent the im-
portation of ermine, fox, kolinsky, merten, mink, muskrat,
and weasel furs and skins, dressed or undressed, which are
the product of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or
of Communist China."^
The report was first taken up on the floor of the Senate on
May 29, 1951. This was an unusual move since in most cases it is
customary for the chamber which called for the conference to consider
the conference report last. The report met with almost no comment
on the Senate floor and was passed by voice vote. The expectation
by the manager of the bill that there would be little debate in the
Senate on the conference report may account for their decision to
refer it to the Senate before the House.
The House took action on the report on June 5 with Representa-
tive Cooper (D-Tenn.) explaining the results to the body. Represents
-
16U. S. Congress, House, Conference Report, Trade Agreements
Extension Act, Report No. 537, 82 Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 2.
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tive Reed (R-N.Y.) then took the floor and explained why the House
conferees had so readily accepted most of the Senate's version of the
bill. He pointed to the House action In restoring the peril point
clause to prove that the House was In favor of restricting Presiden-
tial power. He then added that most of the differences between the
House and the Senate bills were on matters of form and not on mat-
ters of substance. He claimed that the Democratic leadership In the
House had hurried the bill through so quickly that the Republicans
were unable to fully amend the bill to their satisfaction. The
Senate had been successful In obtaining these changes. The House
accepted the report by a voice vote.
Analysis of Conference Results
The 1951 act appears to be an ideal example of the failure
of conference committees to substantially effect a solution equitable
to the interests of both houses. The majority of conferees in the
House accepted the Senate amendments almost in entirety, and made
legislative additions in point eight; thus overstepping its role as a
compromise making body and serving as a legislative committee. There
is nothing in either the House or the Senate bills which prohibits
the importation of certain furs from the Communist bloc countries,
as did the added section of the conference bill.
An analysis of the membership of the House committee, however,
shows that on the one roll-call of significance (the vote on adding
17u. s. Congressional Record , 32nd Congress, 1st Sess., 1951,
Vol. 97, Part 5, p. 6152.
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the peril point clause) that the Democrats on the Ways and Means
committee were unanimous in opposing the Republican amendment while
Republicans on the committee were unanimous in supporting the amend-
18
ment. There were no roll-calls on the bill in the Senate.
There appears to be no logical explanation for House con-
ferees bending so easily to the desires of the Senate on this bill.
It is possible that this was necessary in order to obtain any ex-
tension of the act, but there is no substantial proof of this.
Despite the fact that the House bill was more acceptable to the Admin-
istration, there is no indication that the Administration took any
strong action to obtain the House version of the bill. It is dis-
tinctly possible that the only explanation for the results of the
conference committee deliberations is that Senate Democratic con-
ferees (all Southerners and regarded as anti-Truman) were the dominant
personalities in conference deliberations. There is almost a com-
plete absence of roll call votes available on the 1951 bill, making
a definitive analysis of individual positions difficult. The fact
remains, however, that the Senate won an overwhelming victory in
this conference.
18Dinsell of Michigan did not answer the roll call, but he
has a history of supporting liberal tariff policies and also has a
party unity index of 100 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac , 1951)
.
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HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 1951
Democrats
Doughton (N.C.)
Cooper (Term.)
Oingell (Mich.)
Mills (Ark.)
Gregory (Ken.)
Camp (Ga.)
Forand (R.I.)
Eberharter (Pa.)
Reed (N.Y.)
Woodruff (Mich.)
Jenkins (Ohio)
Simpson (Pa.)
Kean (N.J.)
A.
¥
?
#
$
#
#
#
Republ leans
X
X
X
X
X
King (Cal.)
O’Brien (111.)
Combs (Tex.)
Boggs (La.)
Keogh (N.Y.)
Granger (Utah)
Harrison (Va.)
Curtis (Nev.)
Mason (111.)
Martin (Iowa)
Holmes (Wash.)
Byrnes (Wis.)
A.
?
#
#
*
X
X
X
X
X
*Indicates a member of the 1951 conference committee on the
Trade Extension Act. A. "Peril point" amend. (Simpson) Agreed to
225-168. (R. 183-3) (D. 43-165). Committee shows perfect party-line
voting.
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac-1951 .
Key: X--Agreement with majority
#-
-Disagreement with majority
?—Not present
CHAPTER IV
TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT—1953
In 1953, extension of the reciprocal trade program was con-
sidered for the first time, when both the executive and legislative
branches of government were under the control of the Republican party.
However, the newly inaugurated Republican administration had not
determined its tariff policy when the issue was first raised in
Congress
.
At the beginning of the 83rd Congress two bills were intro-
duced into the House of Representatives concerning U. S. trade agree-
ments. The first was a one-year extension Introduced by Representa-
tive Simpson (R-Pa.). This bill broadened the definition of "injury"
(i. e., the party hurt by reductions) in cases Investigated by the
Tariff Conxnission and also required the President to follow Commis-
sion recommendations on "peril point" and "escape clause" proceedings.
Another bill was Introduced by Representative Frank D. Smith
(D-Miss.) which would have extended the act for three years with the
elimination of the "peril point" and "escape clause" provisions.
Finally, on April 7, President Eisenhower submitted to the
House a request for a one-year extension without significant changes,
pending a "through and comprehensive re-examination" of foreign
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economic policy. On April 15, Representative Keating (R-N.Y.) In-
troduced a bill which had administration approval.
After a long period of testimony, and much bitter debate,
the House Ways and Means Committee adopted a new bill which would
not make the ’’escape clause" findings by the Tariff Commission bind-
ing and which would expire In one year. In addition, the committee
bill Imposed a sizable quota on petroleum Imports and Imports of
residual oil as well as a sliding scale on zinc and lead Imports.
The Rules Consolt tee adopted a modified closed rule which granted a
provision for deleting but not for adding new provisions.
When the committee bill came up for debate on the floor
Representative Cooper (D-Tenn.) Introduced an amendment striking
the provision expanding the Tariff Commission from six to seven mem-
bers. The amendment had been added to assure a Republican majority
on the Commission. The Cooper amendment was defeated by a 115-152
standing vote. A later motion by Representative Smith (D-Mlss.) to
recommit the bill with instructions to delete this provision was also
beaten by a huge 363-3A margin.
The Senate Finance Committee decided on June 18 not to hold
hearings and accepted statements and a digest of the House hearings
on the bill. The committee then overwhelmingly defeated the House
provision increasing the size of the Tariff Commission and reported
the bill on June 26. The Senate adopted the committee bill with
only minor changes after refusing to accept a liberal substitute bill
offered by Senator Kefauver which was similar to the Smith bill
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Introduced in the House. 19 The Senate passed the extension on July 2,
and after insisting on its amendments, it named a conference comnittee
consisting of the chairman and the two ranking majority and two rank-
ing minority members of the Finance Committee as its conferees, as
follows:
Millikin (R-Col. ) George (D-Ga.)
Butler (R-Neb.) Byrd (D-Va.)
Martin (R-Pa.)
The House agreed to the conference and named the chairman of
the Ways and Means committee plus the two ranking majority and two
ranking minority members as its conferees. The members were as fol-
lows:
Reed (R-N. Y.) Cooper (D-Tenn.)
Jenkins (R-Ohio) Dingell (D-Mich.)
Simpson (R-Pa.)
The conference committee held a number of meetings during the
month of July while Congress drew close to adjournment. It was re-
ported that the conferees had reached an impasse over increasing the
membership of the Tariff Commission.^ Finally, in the last days of
the session the conference committee presented a report. The provi-
sions of the report were as follows:
1Congressional Quarterly Almanac-1953 (Washington, D. C.,
1953), pp. 210-21#.
^New York Times, July 21, 1953, p. 1.
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1. The Senate amendment stating the passage of the bill was not
to be construed as either approval or disapproval of the
General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) was accepted.
House recedes.
2. The Senate amendment stating that the Secretary of Agri-
culture could, under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, make emergency recommendations to the President
without awaiting the recommendations of the Tariff Commission
was accepted. House recedes.
3. On the section concerning the controversial increase in
membership of the Tariff Commission, the House had passed an
amendment increasing the membership from six to seven (for
the purpose of obtaining a Republican majority) . The Senate
had struck out this amendment and substituted an amendment by
which, in the case of a tie vote on the Commission, the
President would receive both recommendations, pro and con, and
then he would have the right to accept either report as he
saw fit. The House accepted the content of the Senate amend-
ment but also added the following restrictions:
A. Whenever one-half of the Conmission votes to con-
sider a specific case, it must be considered.
B. Whenever one-half of the Commission votes to hold
hearings on specific grievances, such hearings shall
be held.
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4. The House had added a provision to the amendment which
created the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (later known
as the Randolph Commission) which stated that a quorum on said
Commission would consist of four members appointed by the
President, three Senators and three Representatives. The
Senate amendment stated that any nine members created a
quorum. The compromise provision provided that any nine mem-
bers, including at least five members of Congress, would con-
stitute a quorum.
5. The Senate had removed a House amendment which exempted any
individual appointed to the Commission on Foreign Economic
Policy from being excluded or investigated under the so-called
"conflict of interest laws." The Senate recedes and agrees to
the inclusion of the original House amendment.
6. The Senate and House had adopted amendments which defined the
duties of the Tariff Commission. The compromise merely
accepted the combined wording of both the Senate and House
provisions.
The conference report was signed by all conferees with the
exception of Representative Jenkins. When the report came up for
action on the House floor in the waning hours of the session, Jenkins
explained his reasons for refusing to sign the report. He announced
that he opposed the report because the bill did not provide for the
21U, S. Congress, House Conference Report, Trade Agreements
Extension Act, Report No. 1089, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.
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tariff policy that Republicans had promised the people If they were
elected. He accused the Republican leadership of allowing the minority
to subvert Republican policy. He rebuked his fellow conferees for
refusing to stand firm on the seven-man Tariff Commission which would
Insure a Republican majority. He further charged that all the bill
did was to maintain the same old Commission with the same old
policies.
^
Representative Cooper announced that all minority members of
the conference supported the report and urged Its adoption. 23 The
report was accepted by voice vote on August 1. The report was also
accepted without debate on the final day of the session, August 3, in
the Senate—also by voice vote.
Analysis of Conference Results
It appears that the conference report represented an adequate
compromise between the two legislative bodies. To begin with, the
differences between the two bills were not really extreme. On five of
the differences, ready agreement was obtained. The Senate obtained its
amendments concerning the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and
concerning emergency agricultural tariff changes. The House obtained
its amendment concerning exemption from "conflict of interest" laws,
and an easy compromise was obtained on the issues of defining the
22u. s. Congressional Record , 32nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951,
Vol. 97, Part 5, p. 6152.
23Ibid.
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duties of the new bipartisan fact-finding commission and on the
quorum provisions for the commission.
Tlte only real problem concerned the House amendment to in-
crease the membership on the Tariff Commission. This provision kept
the bill in conference for almost a month. The Republicans of the
House had all supported this amendment with great zeal, but it
finally became apparent that the Senate would not give in to this
attempt to make the Tariff Commission a partisan body. In order to
obtain a compromise solution which both satisfied the House Republi-
cans' desire for a pro-Republican Commission and satisfied the Senate
conferees as well, new wording was required in the conference report.
Without this compromise there would have been no bill, and it seems
apparent that administration pressure was brought to bear on the
Republican conferees in the House to accept some compromise. Despite
this Representative Jenkins refused to accede to the compromise
amendment
.
An examination of Figure 2 shows that there were four roll-
call votes on reciprocal trade in 1953. Of these four, two roll-calls,
A and D, are of primary importance in revealing the positions of con-
ferees on the issues involved. A, the Smith motion to recommit, was
rejected by a twenty vote margin. Since this amendment was concerned
with a highly partisan issue, raising the membership of the Tariff
Commission, the vote was almost entirely along party lines. On this
vote the Republicans of the Ways and Means Committee were unanimously
against recommittal, while the Democrats were unanimously for
recommittal.
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On roll-call D, the motion to recommit the highly protection-
ist Simpson amendments, all three Republican conferees voted against
the majority in the House (Republicans were split 104 for, 105
against recommittal). This would appear to illustrate quite well
that a majority of House conferees in 1953 were of a different bent
on reciprocal trade than was the majority of their party.
Though amendments to the 1953 extension were generally highly
partisan in nature, and feeling ran in accord with party affiliation,
the separate Simpson amendments stimulated bipartisan opposition.
Figure 2 will show how House conferees voted in respect to their
parties and their committee on important roll-call votes. There was a
complete absence of roll-call voting on this issue in the Senate.
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FIGURE 2
HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE-
-1953
Republicans
Reed (N.Y.)
Jenkins (Ohio)
Simpson (Pa.)
Kean (N.J.)
Curtis (Neb.)
Mason (111.)
Martin (Iowa)
Holmes (Wash.)
Byrnes (Wis.)
Goodwin (Mass.)
Sadlak (Conn.)
Baker (Tenn.)
Curtis (Mo.)
Knox (Mich.)
Utt (Cal.)
Democrats
Cooper (Tenn.)
Dingell (Mich.)
Mills (Ark.)
Gregory (Ky.)
Camp (Ga.)
Forand (R.I.)
Eberharter (Pa.)
King (Cal.)
O’Brien (111.)
Boggs (La.)
A. Ci D.XXX#
X # X #XXX#
X X # XXXX#
X # X #
X ? X #
X X # XXXX#
X X # X
X X X XXXX#
X X X XXXX#
X # X #
# X # X
# X ? ?
# X # X
# X X #
# X X #
# X # X
# X # X
# X ? X
# X # X
# X # X
A. Smith motion to recommit with instructions to strike out
the clause raising Tariff Commission membership from 6 to 7. Rejected
185-215. (R. 6-200) (D. 178-15).
]|. Passage of Bill. Passed 363-34. (R. 179-25) (D. 183-9).
C. Motion to amend 1951 Act to provide import quotas on
petroleum products and for a sliding tariff on lead and zinc. Adop-
tion of rule for consideration adopted, 219-183. (R. 138-72)
(D. 81-110).
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FIGURE 2--Continued
D . Motion to recommit Simpson amendment (above)
. Passed
242-161. (R. 104-105) (D. 137-56). Note : Simpson amendment was
considered as a separate bill.
Key : X—Indicates agreement with the majority on the final
vote.
^--Indicates disagreement with the majority on the final
vote.
’—Absent on roll-call vote.
--Indicates conference committee member.
*
CHAPTER V
TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT—1955
In 1954, following the release of the Randall Report, Presi-
dent Eisenhower submitted to Congress what he called "a fresh review'
of tariff policy. 24 However, due to an internal division on tariff
policy between the ultra-protectionists and the moderate advocates
of reciprocal trade, the Republican leadership of the 83rd Congress
was reluctant to get into an extensive disagreement over reciprocal
trade. The administration, therefore, was forced to accept a one-
year extension without important change.
In 1955 the President again submitted his recommendations,
which were quite similar to those of 1954. In essence the President
requested a three-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Act which
authorized reductions on existing tariffs up to 5 percent each year
over a three-year period. He requested the right to cut duties up to
one-half of existing rates on goods imported in negligible quanti-
ties. He also asked for the retention of ’'escape clause * and ’peril
point” provisions and for approval of the proposed revision of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
.
The bill was reported on February 14th from the House Ways
and Means committee with provisions only slightly different from the
^Congressional Quarterly Almanac--1955 (Washington, 1955),
p. 290.
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President's request. The committee bill provided for a three-year
extension with authorization to cut existing rates on selected goods
up to 15 percent at up to 5 percent each year. The other provisions
were generally similar to the President's desires except for the
deletion of the right to cut tariffs on negligible imports by up to
one-half of existing rates. No action was taken on approving the
new GATT agreements.
When the bill came before the House, a disagreement developed
over the procedure in allowing floor amendments. Representative
Howard Smith (D-Va.) offered a closed rule which would have limited
debate and prohibit floor amendments, but the rule was rejected
178-207. After heated debate, a rule offered by Representative
Clarence Brown (R-Ohio), which would have provided for five hours of
debate and also for allowing floor amendments, also failed by a close
191-193 vote. The House finally adopted a closed rule almost iden-
tical to the Smith proposal prohibiting all debate by a 193-192 vote.
After this parliamentary maneuver had been decided and the debate had
been heard. Representative Reed (R-N.Y.) offered a motion to recommit
the committee bil with instructions to require the President to com-
ply with Tariff Commission findings. This motion was defeated by a
199-208 vote. The bill was finally passed on February 18 by a 295-
110 roll-call vote.
When the bill was taken up by the Senate Finance Committee,
protectionists were determined to continue the battle which they iad
lost so narrowly in the House. The committee rejected by a narrow
39
7-8 vote an amendment by Senator Millikin (R-Col.) to cut the exten-
sion of the act from three to two years. This amendment was de-
feated only by the unexpected help of the ultra-protectionist Sena-
tor George Malone (R-Nev.), who maintained that a two-year extension
was as bad as a three-year extension.
The committee did, however, add a number of restrictive
amendments to the House bill including one to limit the volume of
Imports when it threatened our national security and another to
widen the scope of the "escape clause." The bill was finally
approved on April 28 with only Senators Kerr (D-Okla.) and Malone
(R-Nev.) dissenting.
When the bill came to the Senate floor, the Finance Committee
amendments were viciously attacked but all efforts to delete them
were easily beaten (see Figure 6), and the bill was passed with
only one floor amendment accepted, an amendment by Wayne Morse
(D-Ore.) clarifying the right of agricultural producers to seek
Tariff Commission hearings. The bill was passed on May 4 by a 75-
13 roll-call vote. 2 -* The Senate insisted on its amendments and
named the chairman and the two ranking majority and minority members
of the Finance Committee as its conferees. They were as follows:
Byrd (D-Va.) Millikin (R-Col.)
George (D-Ga.)* Martin (R-Pa.)
Kerr (D-Okla.)
25Ibid.
, pp. 282-290.
^Senator Byrd was given the proxy of Senator George's vote
in conference and this was so noted on the conference report.
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The House agreed to conference and named the chairman, the
two ranking majority and the second and third ranking minority mem-
bers of the Ways and Means Committee as its conferees
. The ranking
Republican, Representative Reed of New York, was absent from the
House at this time due to illness. The House conferees were:
Cooper (D-Tenn.) Jenkins (R-Ohio)
Dingell (D-Mich.) Simpson (R-Pa.)
Mills (D-Ark.)
The conference committee, after over a month of deliberation,
presented its report on June 9, 1955. The results of the conference
were as follows:
1. The House had proposed an amendment which would broaden the
number of areas which could be included in a reciprocal trade
agreement. The Senate had struck out this amendment. House
recedes
.
2. The House had provided that the enactment of the bill should
not be construed to indicate the approval or disapproval of
any previous trade agreements. The Senate amendment provided
that enactment of the bill should not be construed to indicate
approval or disapproval of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) . House recedes
.
3. The House had provided for reducing rates by 15 percent of
the existing rate on July 1, 1955. The Senate date was
January 1, 1955. House recedes.
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4. The House provided an amendment authorizing the President
to reduce any rate to 50 percent of the existing rate on
January 1, 1945, on products not normally imported into the
United States or products that are imported in negligible
quantities. The Senate had deleted this amendment. House
recedes
.
5. The House bill contained an amendment stating that if any
trade agreement involving Japan was entered into before
July 1, 1955, the rate of duty on any article was to be
considered the rate existing July 1, 1955. The Senate
eliminated this clause. House recedes.
6. The Senate act required the Tariff Commission to make reports
to Congress on the operation of the trade agreements program.
House recedes.
7. The Senate bill provided that the Tariff Commission be re-
quired to make public immediately its findings and recom-
mendations to the President, including any dissenting or
separate findings and recommendations. House recedes.
8. A compromise amendment concerning the wording of the "Injured
parties 1 ' clause in "escape clause" and "peril point" hearings
was agreed upon. (Injured parties are those concerns directly
affected by changes in tariff rates.)
9. The Senate had added an amendment that rates should not be
lowered if such action would threaten to impair the national
security. The House recedes after changing slightly the
wording but not the intent of the amendment.
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10. The Senate had proposed an amendment to clarify the right of
agricultural interests to seek hearings before the Tariff
Commission. Senate recedes.
11. There were a number of technical and clerical amendments
added by the Senate. House recedes on all. 26
The report was taken up for consideration on June 14 in the
House where It met with some opposition. Representative Cooper,
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, announced that he had signed
the report with "great regret and deep concern.” He stated that it
was his belief that the Senate amendments would seriously weaken
American ability to obtain future rate concessions.
He further explained that the President had sent a letter to
the conferees accepting all the Senate amendments except the Morse
agricultural amendment. Under these conditions the House conferees
did not have much to work with, and they were forced to accept
27
virtually the entire Senate bill.
Representative Jenkins took the floor to express his approval
of the conference results and to urge approval of the report. He
pointed out that a motion to recommit the House bill in order to add
many of these same amendments had been defeated by only an eight vote
margin. Since that vote the President had agreed to accept the changes,
26
U. S. Congress, House, Conference Report, Trade Agreements
Extension Act , Report No. 745, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
27u. g, Congressional Record , 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955,
Vol. 101, Part 6, pp. 8159-8164.
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and therefore the House should accept the conference report?® The
report was finally adopted by a 347-54 margin. The report was taken
up the next day in the Senate and was passed without controversy
by a voice vote.
Analysis of Conference Results
It is apparent that the final result of this conference was
the adoption in entirety, with the exception of the Morse amendment,
of the Senate bill with a few minor changes in wording. It is not
difficult to accept Representative Cooper's explanation that the
willingness of the administration to accept the Senate amendments
virtually cut the ground out from under the House conferees. It
still remains, however, that the House managers did not represent the
majority opinion of their chamber as shown at the time of passage of
the House bill.
An examination of House roll-call votes (Figure 4) will show
that the Democratic conferees voted with the majority of their party
both in the House and in committee on every important roll-call on
this bill. The House Republican conferees, however, did not represent
the majority feeling of their chamber, their party on certain occa-
sions or even the feelings of their party's members on the Ways and
Means Committee.
In determining the attitudes of House conferees, the most
important roll-call votes are items C» D, and E (A, B, and C concern
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virtually the same Issue)
. On Item £, which determined the closed
rule used for debate and the Introduction of amendments, all Demo-
cratic conferees voted with the majority of their fellow Democrats
while Republican conferees voted against the rule but also with the
majority of Republicans. On the important vote D, the Reed motion
to recommit the bill, the conferees of both parties voted with a
majority of their party on the issue. But on item E, final passage,
the Republican conferees, Jenkins and Simpson, both voted against
the bill while a majority of Republicans voted for the bill.
A check of Senate roll-call votes (Figure 3) shows that all
Senate conferees were generally in agreement with their party on
this bill with the exception of Senator Kerr, who voted against the
overwhelming majority in final passage as well as on other key votes.
The most significant roll-calls to consider in order to. determine the
attitudes of conferees in the Senate are items C, D, and E (Fig-
ure 3). Item C is final passage of the bill on which all conferees
voted ye9 except for Senator Kerr who was out of step with the Senate
and with the majority of his party. Item D is actually a Finance
Committee vote on an amendment by Senator Millikin to cut the period
of extension from three to two years. On this vote (rejected 8-7)
Senator Kerr was one of only two committee Democrats to support the
amendment
.
On item E, a committee vote concerning the strengthening of
the escape clause, all three Democratic conferees voted 'Yes while
the committee's Democrats were 9plit evenly at 4-4. This amendment
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was upheld, however, on the floor when the Douglas amendment (Item
B, Figure 3) was defeated. All of these Items point to the fact
that the conservatives held a distinct majority among the Senate's
delegation to the conference committee.
A very real question can be asked here concerning the House's
acceptance of a conference report which was so unrepresentative of
its original views. While there is no proof to justify the over-
whelming acceptance of the conference report in the House, it does
not seem unreasonable to assume that advocates of reciprocal trade
felt that they had gotten the best bill possible. The following
items should be noted on this point:
1. The President had refused to back the House version of the
bill.
2. The House Democratic conferees found themselves fighting
for items in a bill proposed by a Republican President who
would not fight for these items.
3. House Republican conferees were ardent opponents of the idea
of reciprocal trade.
4. The majority for the bill in the House had been very thin,
and the reversal of the President's position was probably
crucial with enough members to change the results in the
House.
5. It was late in the session, and the situation seems to have
become acceptance of the Senate bill or no bill at all.
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FIGURE 3
Finance Committee, U. S. Senate, 1955
Democrats
Byrd (Va.)
George (Ga.)
Kerr (Okla.)
Frear (Del.)
Long (La.)
Smathers (Fla.)
Johnson (Tex.)
Barkley (Ky.)
A.
X
X
#
X
X
X
X
X
B.
X
X
X
X
0
X
#
#
c.
X
X
#
X
X
X
X
X
D.
X
X
#
#
X
X
X
X
E.
X
X
X
X
*
Republicans
Millikin (Col.)
Martin (Pa.)
Williams (Del.)
Flanders (Vt.)
Malone (Nev.)
Carlson (Kan.)
Bennett (Utah)
X
X
#
X
X
X
X
X
X
?
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
#
X
X
#
#
X
X
#
#
X
X
X
X
#
X
X—Indicates agreement with the majority on roll-call votes.
#--Indicates disagreement with the majority on roll-call votes.
?—Indicates absence without pair on roll-call.
--Indicates members of the conference committee.
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Explanation of Figure 3
Morse amendment to provide that no future trade agreement take
effect until expiration of 90 days of continuous session after
Its transmittal to Congress or if disapproved by either chamber
within the 90 day period. Rejected 13-73. (D. 9-33) (R. 4-40).
Committee Democrats 1-7. Committee Republicans 1-6.
Douglas amendment to eliminate the following provisions:
1. requiring immediate publication of Tariff Commission find-
ings and recommendations.
2. providing for use of "escape clause” if imports "contribute
materially” to a threat of serious injury to domestic pro-
ducers .
3. permitting one segment of an industry to seek protection
against injury from imports.
Rejected 21-67. (D. 21-21) (R. 0-46). Committee Democrats 3-5.
Committee Republicans 0-6-1?
Passage of the bill. Passed 75-13. (D. 37-6) (R. 38-7).
Committee Democrats 7-1. Committee Republicans 6-1.
Committee amendment by Millikin to cut extension from three to
two years. Rejected 7-8. (D. 2-6) (R. 5-2).
Committee amendment by Millikin to strengthen escape clause.
Accepted 9-6. (D. 4-4) (R. 5-2).
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FIGURE 4
House Ways and Means Committee, 1955
Democrats A,
Cooper (Tenn.) #
Dingell (Mich.) #
Mills (Ark.) #
Gregory (Ry.) #
Forand (R.I.) x
Eberharter (Pa.) ?
Ring (Cal
. ) #
O'Brien (111.) #
Reogh (N.Y.) #
Harrison (Va.) #
Kars ten (Mo.) #
Herlong (Fla.) #
McCarthy (Minn.) #
Ikard (Tex.) #
Republicans
Reed (N.Y.) #
Jenkins (Ohio) X
Simpson (Pa.) X
Kean (N.J.) #
Mason (111.) X
Holmes (Vash.) #
Byrnes (Wls.) #
Sadlak (Conn.) X
Baker (Tenn.) X
Curtis (Mo.) X
B. C. D. E. F.
X X X X X
x X X X ?
X X X X X
x X X X x
* # # # X
X X X X
x X X X X
x X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X
x X X X X
x X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X
XX##?
# # # # X
# # # # X
X X X X X
# # # # #
X X X X X
X X # X X
# # # X X
# # # X X
# # # X X
X—Indicates agreement with the majority on roll-call vote.
#—Indicates disagreement with the majority on roll-call vote.
?—Indicates absence without pair on roll-call.
—Indicates members of the conference committee.
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Explanation of Figure 4
A. Smith motion to shut off debate on a closed rule. Provided for
two days of debate on the bill with floor amendments prohibited.
Rejected 178-207. (D. 116-101) (R. 62-106). Committee Demo-
crats 13-1-1?. Committee Republicans 4-6.
B. Brown amendment to permit five hours debate and floor amendments.
Rejected 191-193. (D. 82-134) (R. 109-59). Committee Democrats
1-13-1?. Committee Republicans 6-4.
C. Adoption of closed rule. Adopted 193-192. (D. 128-88) (R. 65-
104). Committee Democrats, 14-1. Committee Republicans, 4-6.
D. Reed motion to recommit with instructions to require the
President to comply with recommendation of the Tariff Commission
except where National Security is involved. Rejected 199-208.
(D. 80-140) (R. 119-66). Committee Democrats 1-14. Committee
Republicans 8-2.
E. Final passage of the bill. Passed 295-110. (D. 186-35)
(R. 109-75). Committee Democrats 14-1. Committee Republicans
6-4.
F. Passage of conference report. Accepted 347-54. (D. 197-18)
(R. 150-36). Comnittee Democrats 14-0-1?. Committee Republicans
8- 1 - 1 ?
.
CHAPTER VI
TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT—1958
In 1958 the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which had last been
extended for three years in 1955, came up for further action. The
issue of extension, which produced some six months of bitter debate
in Congress, found both parties split on a number of key provisions.
Protectionists, pointing to the recession of 1957-1958, argued that
tariff barriers must be raised in order to stop the mounting toll of
unemployment. Advocates of a greater degree of free trade held that
such a move would only provoke international retaliation which in
turn would further harm the American economy. ^9
In a special message to Congress on January 30, 1958,
President Eisenhower asked for a five-year extension of the trade
agreements program "unweakened by amendments of a kind that would
impair its effectiveness.” Other highlights of the President's pro-
gram were as follows:
1. Authorization was sought to reduce tariffs over the five-
year period by 25 percent, either at 5 percent each year or
over a three-year period with no single reduction of over
10 percent.
2. Authorization was sought in cases where tariffs were already
^Congressional Quarterly Almanac-1958 (Washington, D. C.,
1958), p. 165?
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low, to cut duties by three percentage points "ad valorua"
with no reduction to exceed one percent per year.
3. Authorization was sought to reduce to 50 percent of value
the rate of tariff on any item exceeding 50 percent.
4. Authorization was asked to raise tariffs under "escape
clause procedures to a maximum of 50 percent above the
rates In effect on July 1, 1934 (Instead of 1945 as in the
1955 law).
5. Retention of the "peril point" and "escape clause* provi-
sions in this present form was requested.
The request for a five-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade
Act was unique since the previous maximum requested by a President
and approved by Congress had been three years. The main reason for
the five-year request centered around the new European Economic
Community (Common Market) which was forming long-term trade agree-
ments which threatened to upset the U. S. export totals.
The House of Representatives bill, as reported by the Ways
and Means Committee, gave the President most of what he requested.
But in addition it included an amendment which would provide Con-
gress, by a two-thirds vote of both chambers, with the right to
override the President if he rejected import curbs as recommended
by the Tariff Commission.
The House voted to adopt a modified closed rule which pro-
vided to the opponents of the committee bill, in addition to the
usual motion to recommit, the right to present as an alternative
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a ouch more restrictive bill which had the backing of Representative
Richard Simpson (R-Pa.) of the Ways and Means Committee. Opponents
of the bill failed in their two opportunities, the first on the
Simpson amendment (147-234) and the second on a motion to reconxnlt
the bill (146-263), and the bill as reported by committee passed the
House on June 11 by a roll-call vote of 317-98.
When the House bill was sent to the Senate, substantial
opposition arose to the reciprocal trade program, and Minority Leader
Knowland of California announced that he would support only a three-
year extension of the act. When the Finance Committee reported the
bill, it provided for a three-year extension of the act and also
Included the controversial Kerr amendment. This amendment severely
restricted the President by forcing him to accept Tariff Commission
findings unless he could gain approval for not following the Commis-
sion's report by a majority vote of each chamber of Congress.
The Committee bill also included an amendment by Senator
Flanders of Vermont which would set up a nine-man commission to study
objectives and operations of the reciprocal trade program then in
effect.
(to the floor of the Senate, the Kerr amendment was defeated
by a 63-27 roll-call vote, and later an amendment by Senator Payne,
similar to the House amendment which would have given Congress the
right to overrule the President, was rejected by a 34-57 vote. This
amendment proposed overruling the President by a majority vote
Instead of the two- thirds vote in the House amendment. The Senate
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adopted by voice vote an amendment proposed by Senator Horse (D-Ore.)
which provided that in escape clause and peril point proceedings,
growers of a commodity or producers of raw materials would be con-
sidered as part of an industry under the act's definition of
injured parties. 30
This Morse amendment, known to the press as the Oregon cherry
growers' amendment, was the cause of a bitter debate between Senators
Morse and Neuberger, both of Oregon. Neuberger charged that such an
amendment would riddle the trade program with political log rolling
if agricultural Interests such as the Northwest cherry growers were
given special consideration. Though it was reported that the admin-
istration was strongly opposed to the Morse amendment, the New York
Times reported that Senate leaders felt that the Morse amendment and
other restrictive Senate amendments could be eliminated in confer-
ence.^*
The bill finally passed the Senate on July 22 by a 72-16 roll-
call vote, and the Senate, insisting on a conference, named the chair-
man of the Finance Committee plus the two ranking majority and minority
committee members as its conferees. These Senate conferees were:
Byrd (D-Va.) Martin (R-Pa.)
Kerr (D-Okla.) Williams (R-Del .
)
Frear (D-Del
.
)
30Ibid., pp. 170-173.
^J-Allan Drury, New York Times , August 2, 1958, p. 15.
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The House agreed to a conference and named the chairman of
the Ways and Means Committee plus the two ranking Democrats and
the first and third ranking Republicans as Its managers. They were:
Mills (D-Ark.) Reed (R-N.Y.)
Gregory (D-Ky.) Simpson (R-Pa.)
Forand (D-R.I.)
It is not difficult to understand why the House Republicans
passed over Representative Jenkins of Ohio, the second ranking
Republican and also an arch-protectionist, in favor of Representative
Simpson. Representative Simpson had been a leader in opposing the
reciprocal trade program and had sponsored the floor amendment which
would have severely limited the President in making tariff agreements.
He was considered to be the leader of protection-minded Republicans
in the House.
On August 2, 1958, John D. Morris reported in the New York
Times that an unexpected disagreement had deadlocked conference pro-
ceedings. Representative Forand, generally a liberal Democrat but
from economically depressed Rhode Island, announced that unless the
Senate managers would accept the House amendment calling for a Con-
gressional two-thirds veto, then he would vote with Reed and Simpson
to limit the bill to three years. Morris further reported that
Representative Mills had proposed a package deal whereby the Senate
would accept the Forand amendment in exchange for House accept.ance Ot
an amendment by Senator Byrd which would force the Tariff Commission
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to consider unemployment end the effect on the national economy when
examining escape clause provisions .32
The conference committee finally agreed on a compromise and
reported the conference bill on August 6, 1958. The conference
report contained the following provisions.
1. The extension was to be for four years. This was a compro-
mise between the House of Representative's five-year bill
and the Senate's three-year proposal for extension.
2. The Senate amendment reducing the base date from 1945 back
to 1934 was accepted. This had been one of the President’s
original proposals. House recedes.
3. The President would be allowed to reduce tariff rates by up
to 20 percent. This was also a compromise between the 25
percent House proposal and the 15 percent Senate figure.
4. The cuts would be made in up to four stages. This was also
a compromise between the five-step House bill and the
three-step Senate bill with the same provision applying in
both cases, due to the four-year extension which made this
compromise inevitable.
5. The House was successful in maintaining that the President
could cut tariffs by up to 10 percent per year. The Senate
bill had limited cuts to only 5 percent per year. Senate
recedes
.
6. The Senate was successful in retaining the Ervin amendment
32John D. Morris, New York Times , August 2, 1953, p. 15.
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which broadened the power of the Tariff Comnission to make
peril point recommendations
. House recedes.
7. The Senate receded from the Morse (cherry growers) amendment
which would have made agricultural interests a party to
escape clause findings. This amendment was completely
unacceptable to the administration.
8. The Senate receded from the Humphrey amendment which would
have required that the Tariff Commission seek alternative
employment for workers who were harmed in escape clause
cases.
9. The House was successful in retaining the Forand amendment
which provided Congress with the right to override the
President on escape clause and peril point recommendations
of the Tariff Commission if a two-thirds majority in both
chambers disapproved of the President’s action. This was
the first time in the history of the trade agreements act
that Congress had provided itself with a way of overruling
the President's decision. Senate recedes.
10. The House accepted a Senate amendment which changed the
wording of the national security clause so as to spell out
the duties of the Director of Defense Mobilization in making
recommendations to the President concerning tariff changes
which threatened the national security. House recedes.
11. The House agreed to accept the Byrd amendment which pro-
vided that the economic welfare of the country be considered
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a® part of our national security. However, the Senate
agreed to add the word ''substantial" to the clause which
defined unemployment as a factor in evaluating economic wel-
fare. House recedes in substance.
12. The Senate agreed to drop the Flanders amendment calling for
a bipartisan commission to review the operation of our
reciprocal trade program. Senate recedes.
13. The Senate also agreed to drop an amendment which called for
the restriction in certain cases of trade agreements until
an adjustment of national production could be made to suit
national economic conditions. Senate recedes. 33
The report was signed by all the conference committee Demo-
crats plus Republican Senator Martin. Representative Reed and
Representative Simpson announced later on the floor of the House
that they had not signed the bill because they were in basic dis-
agreement with its content. Despite their refusal and despite the
fact that they urged that the report be rejected, both admittedly
found the conference bill "less unacceptable" than the original
House bill.
After a brief debate over the ultimate value of the Forand
veto provision, the House passed the conference report by a 161-56
standing vote on August 7.
33u. s. Congress, House, Conference Report, Trade Agreements
Extension Act, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess.
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On August 10, the Senate took up the report and after an
oral explanation by Senator Byrd, Senator Flanders stated a serious
objection to the deletion of the bipartisan conmlsslon from the
Senate version of the bill. Senator Byrd and Senator Martin both
spoke concerning the refusal of both the House conferees and the
Administration to accept the commission proposal. Both stated
that the House had demanded such a wide number of changes in the
commission that the basic idea of the amendment would have been
lost. 34 Despite this Senator Flanders called for a rejection of the
conference report. The Senate, however, passed the report on a
72-18 roll-call vote.
Analysis of Conference Results
It would appear then that this bill represented a fairly
effective compromise between the House and Senate bills. There is no
Indication that the conference introduced any new material or
deleted any material which was contained in both the House and the
Senate bills. It would, however, seem as though the House held an
advantage in the conference committee deliberations. In six cases
of difference between the two bills, the House obtained its version,
in four cases the Senate version was accepted, and in three cases
there was a genuine compromise between the two houses.
^U. S. Congressional Record , 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958,
Vol. 104, Part 13, p. 16821.
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It seems apparent that the proponents of the reciprocal
trade program had foreseen a friendly representation in conference
and had allowed many of the Senate's restrictive amendments to be
eliminated in this conference. The House's concessions to the
Senate in most cases came on rattier minor points.
It also seems apparent that in every case but one (the
Congressional veto amendment) that the House bill had the support of
the administration. It would appear likely that this support was
decisive in winning the all-important votes of the Senate's Republi-
can delegation, even though Senator Williams refused to sign the
conference report. Senator Williams lias stated that he disagreed
with the length of the extension (four years), feeling that the bill
should come up for more frequent review. ^5
In determining how well the conferees represent the feelings
of their respective chamber and their standing committee I have
examined the vote of the entire standing committees on certain key
roll-call votes (Figures 5 and 6). I have also used the Senate
Finance Committee vote on the Kerr amendment to further determine
the feelings of Senate conferees.
In the case of the Finance Committee, it is obvious that
while Senators Kerr and Frear represented the feelings of the majority
of Democrats on the Finance Committee, they did not represent the
feelings of the majority of Senate Democrats. Senator Martin and
^^Letter to the author by the Hon. John J. Williams, United
States Senator from Delaware, Washington, D. C., July 28, 1961.
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Senator Williams, however, did seem to represent the majority of
their party in both the committee and in the entire Senate.
In regard to House members of the conference, it is apparent
that Representatives Mills and Gregory did represent the feelings
of their chamber in regard to the overall content of the bill.
There is good indication, however, from press reports that Repre-
sentative Mills and Representative Gregory did not approve of the
Congressional veto provision. Representative Gregory was absent
from both roll-calls on reciprocal trade so it is not possible to
determine his attitude from roll-call results. Mr. Gregory was, how-
ever, a firm supporter of liberal reciprocal trade legislation in
the past, and he did back the Ways and Means Committee bill of the
Democratic majority in committee.
On the Republican side it seems that Representative Reed
and Representative Simpson did not represent the feelings of the
majority of the Republican party on this bill. While a majority of
the Republican members of the Ways and Means Committee did vote
against the bill, three Republican members voted with the majority
of their party in backing the content of the bill. Their positions
on the bill as voted by the House would seem to indicate that Reed
and Simpson did not provide representation for the majority of their
party in the conference.
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FIGURE 5
Senate Finance Committee, 1958
Members
Democrats:
Byrd (Va.)
Kerr (Okla.)
Frear (Del.)
Long (La.)
Smathers (Fla.)
Anderson (N.M.)
Douglas (111.)
Gore (Tenn.)
Republicans:
Martin (Pa.)
Williams (Del.)
Flanders (Vt.)
Malone (Nev.)
Carlson (Kan.)
Bennett (Utah)
Jenner (Ind.)
A. B. C.
XX#
# # X
# X X
# X X
# X X
# x XXX#XX#
XXXXX#XX#
# # XXX#XX#
# # X
A. Johnson amendment to delete the Kerr Finance Committee
amendment. Passed 63-27. (Democrats 27-18) (Republicans 36-9).
Finance Committee Democrats 3-5. Finance Conniittee Republicans 5-2.
B. Final Senate passage on the bill. Passed 72-16. (Demo-
crats 36-6) (Republicans 36-10). Finance Committee Democrats 7-1.
Finance Committee Republicans 5-2.
C. Finance Committee vote on the Kerr amendment which was
later defeated on the floor (A.). Agreed to by 8-7 vote. Democrats
5-3. Republicans 3-4. Only Senator Martin changed his vote when
this matter came to the floor of the Senate.
Key : X--Indicates agreement with the majority on the vote.
#—Indicates disagreement with the majority on the vote.
—Indicates conference committee members.
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FIGURE 6
House Ways and Means Committee, 1958
Members
Democrats
:
Mills (Ark.)
Gregory (Ry
.)
Forand (R.I.)
Eberharter (Pa.)
King (Cal.)
O'Brien (111.)
Boggs (La.)
Keogh (N.Y.
Harrison (Va.)
Kars ten (Mo.)
Herlong (Fla.)
McCarthy (Minn.)
Ikard (Tex.)
Machrowicz (Mich.)
Frazier (Tenn.)
Republicans
:
Reed (N.Y.)
Jenkins (Ohio)
Simpson (Pa.)
Kean (N.J.)
Mason (111.)
Holmes (Wash.)
Byrnes (Wis.)
Sadlak (Conn.)
Baker (Tenn.)
Curtis (Mo.)
A. B.
X
?
X
X
g
X
X
X
X
g
X
X
X
X
X
?
X
g
X
X
X
X.
X
X
X
X
X
X
I
£
X
*
X
#
X
#
X
li-
lt
#
X
X
A. Reed motion to recommit bill to committee. Defeated 146-
268. (Democrats 61-160) (Republicans 85-108). Committee Democrats
0-14-1?. Committee Republicans 7-3.
B. Final House passage. Passed 317-98. (Democrats 184-39)
(Republicans 133-59). Committee Democrats 14-0-1? . Committee
Republicans 4-6.
Key; X—Indicates agreement with the majority on the vote.
#—Indicates disagreement with the majority on the vote
?—indicates absence from the roll-call vote.
--Indicates conference committee member.
CHAPTER VII
THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT—1962
One of the most Important legislative victories of the Ken-
nedy administration was the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962. This bill provided the first new approach to world trade since
the original passage of the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934. Unlike all
preceding bills discussed in this paper, the 1962 act was not an
extension of the 1934 law. It was new and completely superseded the
1934 law.
In late 1961 it became apparent that the Kennedy administra-
tion had decided to seek a trade bill in 1962. One by one important
voices in the administration. Undersecretary of State Ball, Secretary
of the Treasury Dillon, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of
Commerce Hodges, made important policy addresses on the need for a
new United States outlook on world trade. Finally on December 6,
1961, the President outlined the administration's plans to the
National Association of Manufacturers in New York. The President
left no question of his intention to seek new legislation when he
said that the 1934 Trade Agreements Act ''must not simply be renewed,
34
it must be replaced. M
•^Elizabeth J. Brenner, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962
(Washington, 1962), p. 15.
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The formal Administration request was sent to Congress on
January 25, 1962, and it was Introduced the same day by Represents*
tlve Wilbur Mills (D.-Ark.), Chairman of the Ways and Means Coomlt-
tee, the committee which would handle the legislation. In his mes-
sage President Kennedy stressed the growth of the European Conrnon
Market, the United States balance of payments deficits, the growth of
Communist world trade, and the need for new markets for Japan and the
newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. The proposed bill
would have granted the President five kinds of trade negotiating
authority over a five-year period. They were as follows:
1. A general authority to reduce tariffs by 50 percent in recip-
rocal negotiations.
2. A special authority to be used in negotiating with the
European Common Market, to reduce or eliminate all tariffs on
products where the United States and the Common Market to-
gether account for 80 percent or more of world trade.
3. A special authority to eliminate tariffs on agricultural
products if this would maintain or expand United States
exports of agricultural goods.
4. A special authority to reduce or eliminate all duties on
tropical agricultural and forestry products produced by
friendly underdeveloped nations and not produced in signif-
icant quantities in the United States.
5. A special authority to negotiate for the elimination of
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tariffs on goods currently dutied at five percent or
less.^
In addition to the authority requested above, the bill also
proposed many other things. Among the most important of these pro-
posals were the extension of the most favored nation principle, a
change in the duties of the Tariff Commission, elimination of the
peril point clause, authority to raise tariffs up to 50 percent for
extraordinary relief to injured industries and the creation of an
Adjustment Assistance Advisory Board.
The House Ways and Means Committee began four and one-half
weeks of hearings on the bill on March 12, 1962. Over 245 witnesses
appeared to express their opinions on the bill and the Committee's
record contained 4,233 pages of testimony. After much deliberation,
a new ’’clean' bill was introduced by Chairman Mills on June 4 and was
passed the same day. The bill contained all the basic authorities
requested by the President. About this time the Administration's
public relations campaign reached its peak, and the President along
with former President Eisenhower and former Secretary of State Herter
appeared on nationwide television to back passage of the bill.
The House called up the bill on June 27 under a 'closed rule"
which prevented floor amendments to the bill. Under this closed rule,
adopted by an 8-7 vote in the Rules Committee, only one recomraital
motion was in order. Representative Noah Mason (R-Ill.), the senior
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Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, made it clear that he
would exercise his prerogative to move for reconanital with instruc-
tions to substitute a bill calling only for a one-year extension of
the existing Trade Agreements Act. The second ranking Republican on
the committee, Representative John Byrnes (R-Wis.), wished to offer
a motion to recommit the bill with instructions to cut the adjust-
ment assistance section of the bill, but the Rules Committee refused
by a similar 8-7 vote to allow the motion to be presented to the full
House.
Debate and floor action took only two days in the House of
Representatives. Most of the debate centered around the Mason motion
to recommit, and it was unclear until the final moments before the
roll call how Representative Byrnes and Minority Leader Halleck
(R-Ind.) would stand on the Mason motion. In the final moments of
debate both Byrnes and Halleck supported Mason with reservations, but
neither made support of Mason a party issue. As a result the motion
failed by a vote of 253-171. Shortly afterward the committee bill
was passed by a 298-125 vote (see Figure 7, item C).
The Senate Finance Committee took up the trade bill on
July 23 and held four weeks of hearings on the bill. The committee
then studied the bill for one month before taking action on a number
of amendments on September 14. Many restrictive amendments were
offered but all the amendments were rejected by either a vote of 8-7
or 9-7 with Senator Kerr (D-Okla.) leading the Administration forces
in fighting restrictions to the bill. The final bill, passed by a
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17-0 vote by the committee, did not differ from the House bill on any
of the basic authorities requested by the Administration. The major
changes In the Finance Committee bill were restoration of 'most
favored nation" status to Poland and Yugoslavia, the addition of
extra discretionary restrictions for the President in cases where
low tariffs might damage our national interest, and a requirement
that the Federal government pay full costs for the unemployment com-
pensation for workers provided in the bill. The House bill provided
that the Federal government pay the difference between state rates
and rates set by the bill.
The bill was brought before the Senate on September 18, and
Administration leaders were successful in defeating all restrictive
amendments offered. The closest vote for proponents of the bill
came on an amendment by Senator Prescott Bush (R-Conn.). Senator
Bush's amendment would have restored the "peril point" procedure of
the existing Trade Agreements Act to the new bill. The amendment was
defeated by a 38-40 vote. Other restrictive amendments by Senator
Byrd (D-Va.), Senator Dirksen (R-Ill.) and Senator Curtis (R-Neb.)
were defeated by more comfortable margins (see Figure 8) , and the
Senate passed the bill the following day, September 19, by a 78-8
vote.
Upon passage of the Trade Expansion Act by the Senate, Sen-
ator Byrd moved that the Senate insist on its amendments and appoint
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conferees to meet with members of the House. 38 Vice President
Johnson r.amed the four ranking Democrats and the first, second and
fifth ranking Republicans of the Senate Finance Committee to serve
as its conferees.
Byrd (D-Va.) Williams (R-Del.)
Kerr (D-Okla.) Carlson (R-Kan.)
Long (D-La.) Curtis (R-Neb.)
Smathers (D-Fla.)
On the following day, September 20, 1962, Representative
Mills moved that the House agree to conference. The motion was
37
accepted by voice vote. Speaker of the House McCormick then named
the first, second, fourth and fifth ranking Democrats and the three
ranking Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee to be the
House members of the conference committee.
Mills (D-Ark.) Mason (R-Ill.)
King (D-Cal.) Byrnes (R-Wis.)
Boggs (D-La.) Baker (R-Tenn.)
Keogh (D-N.Y.)
The conference committee met for only one day, September 26,
and it resolved all differences between the two houses on the Trade
Extension Bill. 38 The major results of conference committee action
are listed below.
36
U. S. Congressional Record , 87th Congress, Second session,
Vol. 108, part 15, p. 19876.
37 Ibid .
,
p. 20093.
33Baltimore Sun, September 27, 1962, p. 1.
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1 . The House had provided that one of the purposes of the legis-
lation was "to prevent Communist economic penetration" in
the free world. The Senate eliminated this phrase. The
amendment is reinserted into Section 102. Senate recedes.
2. The Senate had changed Chapter 2, title 2, of the House bill.
The House had provided in this section that the President be
authorized to reduce by more than 50 percent duties on certain
articles traded with members of the European Economic Conraunity
(Common Market) . The Senate had amended this to include any
member of the "free European trading community," meaning the
Common Market members or member of the so-called "Oiter
Seven," the European Free Trade Association. This would add
Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria
and Portugal to the list of nations included. The House
version was restored to the bill. Senate recedes.
3. The Senate modified Section 221 of the bill, dealing with
duties of the Tariff Commission, to make clearer what this
body should research before reporting its findings to the
President. House recedes.
4. Under Section 225-b, the House had required the President,
during a four-year period beginning on the date of enactment
of the bill, to reserve certain articles from any further
reduction of duty. All the articles in the list had been
investigated previously by the Tariff Commission and a
majority of this body had found either serious injury to
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domestic industry or threat thereof. The Senate had extended
the reservation to five years. House recedes.
5. The Senate had added to Section 252»a, a section granting the
President the power to take tariff action against countries
impairing American commerce, an amendment requiring the
President to seek special tariff advantages for United States
agricultural products. The conference accepted the Senate
amendment in principle with some rewording of the amendment.
House recedes in substance.
6. The Senate had added an amendment sponsored by Senator
Bartlett (D-Alaska) which directed the President to call a
conference on conservation of international fishing resources.
If nations failed to respond to such a conference, the Presi-
dent was instructed to raise tariffs on fish from such coun-
tries. The House accepted the amendment with technical change.
House recedes.
7. Section 323-c had made the Federal government responsible
for only the amount of trade readjustment allowance not pro-
vided by the state involved. A Senate amendment made the
Federal government directly responsible for the allowance
mentioned above. House recedes.
8. The Senate provided an amendment which would permit the
Tariff Commission "upon its own motion" as well as on the
request of the President to submit its recommendations on
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the probable economic effect to an Industry of duty changes.
Houae recedes.
9. The Senate had added an amendment to Section 352 of the bill
which related to orderly marketing procedures. Under this
amendment the President would be permitted to negotiate agree-
ments limiting exports with countries when United States
industries were found to be seriously damaged. Under the
House bill the President could only react to such situations
by raising American tariff rates. House recedes.
10. This was a new amendment written into the bill which did not
appear in either the House or Senate bills. The amendment
gave the President authority to '‘increase duties, impose new
tariffs not otherwise subject to duty, and to impose quotas
when he finds them to be in the national interest.”
11. Section 231 of the House bill directed the President to
suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of any trade
agreement concessions to products of any country or areas
dominated or controlled by Communism. The Senate had struck
out ''any country dominated or controlled by Comnunism and
inserted "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Communist
China, and any other country or area dominated by the
foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Consaunist movement.” The main intention of the Senate
change was to allow the President to extend 'most favored
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nation'' status to Poland and/or Yugoslavia if he saw fit
to do so. Senate recedes.
The conference report was filed on October 2, and both
chambers met to consider the report on October 4. In the House
Mr. Mills explained the report and commented on the pressures
brought to bear on him to accept the Senate's version of item
eleven above. He said that he felt that in 1951 Congress "wrote in
a complete limitation against most favored nation treatment to Com-
munist nations, and that most favored nation treatment to Poland and
Yugoslavia was granted in contravention to this prohibition by
Congress."*0 The House then accepted the report on a 265-91 roll
call vote (see item D, Figure 7).
The Senate took up the conference report the same day, and
Senator Byrd explained the report to the Senate. He remarked that
"the House (conferees) were adament on insisting on the prohibition
of most favored nation treatment for any Communist country. We were
told by the chairman (Mr. Mills) that he would refuse to sign the
report without this amendment. The Senate could do nothing. It
was compelled to recede."**
39
U. S. Congress, House, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Con-
ference Report
,
87th Cong., 2nd sees., 1962, Rept. no. 2518, pp. 5-
13 .
*°Brenner, op. cit ., pp. 37-38.
**U. S. Congressional Record , 87th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol.
108, part 16, p. 20098.
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During a brief debate, Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) called
the suspension of most favored nation treatment to Yugoslavia and
Poland "a very serious blunder.*'42 The Senate, however, accepted
the report by a voice vote.
Analysis of Conference Action
A first look at the results of the conference committee
action on the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is very deceiving. One
would gather from the data that the Senate gained a definite advan-
tage in the conference actions. Further analysis tempers this im-
pression, however. Of the eleven significant issues discussed by
the conference committee, the House conferees receded on seven amend-
ments, the Senate conferees receded on three amendments and one
amendment contains what is basically new legislation, not found in
either the House or Senate bills.
Two of the three amendments to which the Senate receded were
of a substantial nature. In one of these amendments the Senate
attempted to broaden the scope of trade concessions to the Common
Market to include the so-called "Ckxter Seven." The House refused
to accept this modification, and the final bill reverted to include
authority to negotiate only with the Common Market itself on these
trade matters.
The other substantial House victory was on the Senate amend-
ment which was intended to grant the President the right to extend
42Brenner, op. cit ., p. 38.
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again most favored nation treatment to Poland and Yugoslavia. There
is no doubt that the Administration wanted this Item badly and that
It did everything possible to convince the House delegation of its
desires. In his report to the Senate, Chairman Byrd made it clear
'- uat: Representative Mills would not consent to this amendment under
any circumstances, no matter what pressure was exerted by the Admin-
istration, and there was obviously little chance of passing the bill
in the House without Mills’ full support as Mills was the unchallenged
leader of the House delegation and carried immense prestige within the
House.
All of the seven Senate amendments consented to by the con-
ferees were acceptable to the Administration and to Representative
Mills. Therefore numbers are very misleading in this conference ac-
tion.
One amendment reported by the conference was a completely new
addition to the legislation and did not appear in either the House
or Senate bill. This amendment granted the President a broad power
to raise or impose quotas on imports 5 ’in the national interest."
This is an implicit instance of the conference committee overstepping
its parliamentary rights.
This conference presents an interesting study in the impor-
tance of individuals. To begin with, the seniority rule was broken
twice in the appointment of conferees. Both the House and Senate
named seven rather than the standard five conferees to be their
representatives, and in each case there can be little doubt that this
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was intended to strengthen the hand of the most powerful Individuals
within the conference. The addition of Representatives Keogh and
Baker to the House’s representation strengthened the hand of Repre-
sentative Mills, as both agreed fully with Mills on crucial votes
in the House on this bill (see Figure 7). The addition of Senator
Smathers, a proadmlnlstratlon Senator on this bill, undoubtedly
strengthened the hand of Senator Kerr, the leading Administration
spokesman within the conference. Democratic Senator Byrd (Va.) had
opposed the Administration on every key vote in the Finance Committee
and on the Senate floor (see Figure 8). It seems as though two men
dominated the conference decisions in the end; 1. e.. Representative
Mills and Senator Kerr (Okla.). In the final analysis. Representa-
tive Mills was the victor, as he carried his position on the Poland,
Yugoslavia amendment, the only key difference between the two men.
As has been true in practically every case studied in this
paper, the selection of conferees on the basis of seniority tends
to produce selections which are quite unrepresentative of the
majority will. Referring to the Ways and Means Committee, we find
that as usual Representative Mills had his committee majority in
line on all crucial votes. Therefore the four Democrats selected
were as representative as any could be. The passing over of taird
ranking Representative O’Brien (111.) is unexplained, and the only
explanation forthcoming from his office was that he asked to be
excused in order to campaign at home for his re-election. It is
notable, however, that Representative Keogh, Mr. O'Brien's
replace-
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tnent, was known to be much more amenable to Mr. Mills' leadership,
especially on the Poland, Yugoslavia issue than was Mr. O'Brien.
Among Republican members of the House, we find three basic
groups; i. e., those opposed to any substantial legislation, those
seeking more moderate legislation than that wished by the Adminis-
tration, and those favoring the Administration approach in principle.
The three conferees (Mason, Byrnes and Baker) each represented one
of these groups.
Referring to the Senate (Figure 8) we find that three of
the four Democrats, Kerr, Long and Smathers, were consistent advo-
cates of the Administration approach in both the Finance Committee
and on the Senate floor. Senator Byrd, however, was basically
opposed to the legislation. Among the Republicans we find that
Senators Williams and Carlson were generally in favor of Republican
efforts to limit the scope of the bill. Senator Curtis, who was
picked over Senators Bennett (Utah) and Butler (Md.), led Republican
opposition to the Administration approach.^ Party lines were sur-
prisingly consistent on roll call votes on this bill in the Senate.
^^The general feeling of competent sources in the Senate was
that both Bennett and Butler asked to be exempted from conference
committee service. Senator Bennett was fighting a close re-election
bid in Utah while Senator Butler was retiring and had become quite
inactive in the Senate by this time.
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FIGURE 7
House Ways and Means Committee—1962
Members
Democrats
:
Mills (Ark.)
King (Cal.)
O'Brien (111.)
Boggs (La.)
Keogh (N.Y.)
Harrison (Va.)
Kars ten (Mo.)
Herlong (Fla.)
Frazier (Tenn.)
Green (Pa.)
Watts (Ky.)
Ullman (Ore.)
Burke (Mass.)
Thompson (Tex.)
Griffiths (Mich.)
Republicans
:
Mason (111.)
Byrnes (Wis.)
Baker (Tenn.)
Curtis (Mo.)
Knox (Mich.)
Utt (Cal.)
Betts (Ohio)
Alger (Tex.)
Derounian (N.Y.)
Schneebeli (Pa.)
A. B. C. D.
X X X X
x X X Xxxx?
X X X x
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X Xxxx?
X X X Xxxx?
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
# # # #
X # X X
X X X X
X X X X
# # # #
# # # #
# # # #
# # # #
X # X X
X # X X
Key ; X—Indicates agreement with the majority on the vote.
#—Indicates disagreement with the majority on the vote.
?
--Indicates absence with no opinion recorded.
—Indicates conference committee member.
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Explanation of Figure 7
A. Committee vote on passage of final committee draft. Passed
20-5. Democrats 15-0, Republicans 5-5.
B. Mason motion to recommit the bill. Rejected 171-253. Demo-
crats 44-210, Republicans 127-43.
C. Final passage of the bill. Approved 298-125. Democrats 218-35,
Republicans 80-90.
D. Passage of Conference Report. Passed 256-91. Democrats 178-34,
Republicans 78-57.
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FIGURE 8
Finance Committee, U. S. Senate— 1962
Members
Democrats:
A. B. C. D. E. F.
Byrd (Va.)
Kerr (Okla.)
Long (La.)
Smathere (Fla.)
Anderson (N.M.)
Douglas (111.)
Gore (Tenn.)
Talmadge (Ga.)
McCarthy (Minn.)
Hartke (Ind.)
Fulbright (Ark.)
#
X
X
X
X
X
?
#
X
X
X
#
X
X
X
X
X
X
#
I
X
?
#
X
X
X
X
X
7
X
X
X
?
#
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
7
X
X
X
X
X
X
#
X
I
7
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
7
Republicans
:
Williams (Del.)
Carlson (Kan.)
Bennett (Utah)
Butler (Md.)
Curtis (Neb.)
Morton (Ity.)
#
#
#
#
#
7
#
#
#
?
#
7
#
7
#
7
#
X
#
#
7
A
#
*
7
X
X
#
X
#
X
Key : X—Indicates agreement with the majority on the vote.
#—Indicates disagreement with the majority on the vote.
7—Indicates absence with no public declaration.
—Indicates conference committee member.
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Explanation of Figure 8
A. Byrd committee notion to eliminate the trade adjustment sections
of the bill. Rejected 7-8. Democrats 2-8, Republicans 5-0.
B. Bush amendment to restore the "peril point" procedures to the
act. Rejected 38-40. Democrats 13-40, Republicans 25-0.
£. Curtis amendment to eliminate trade adjustment provisions giv-
ing aid to firms and workers adversely affected by adjustments.
Rejected 23-58. Democrats 5-50, Republicans 18-8.
D. Byrd amendment to widen the escape clause provisions of the
bill. Rejected 34-45. Democrats 12-41, Republicans 22-4.
_E . Dirksen amendment to cut the scope of the act from five to
three years. Rejected 28-56. Democrats 5-51, Republicans 23-5.
F. Final Passage. Accepted 78-8. Democrats 56-1, Republicans
22-7.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the five preceding case studies has been to
note patterns of regularity in regard to five pertinent questions on
conference committees. First of all, I have attempted to ascertain
the role of the conference committee in the legislative system.
Secondly, I have looked at the question of interchamber competition
in the conference committee between the delegations of the House
of Representatives and the Senate.
The third area of investigation lias involved individual con*
ferees. Who have been the dominant individuals in each respective
conference? Another area of concern is the representation function
of the conference committee. Have the conferees collectively and
individually "represented' 1 the feelings of their chambers as expressed
in roll call voting. Finally, I have looked at the question of the
role of the President in conference committee deliberation. Has the
President attempted to influence conference committee deliberations 7
If so, what has been the extent of his influence
A. The Role of the Conference Committee
The conference committee as defined in the rules of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate is a compromise-making body.
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In other words, this group is expected to find a consensus of opin-
ion somewhere between the House and Senate versions of a bill that
ke acceptable to both chambers. The committee is not expected
to legislate or to write new legislation and, in fact, is pro-
hibited from doing so in the rules of both chambers.
Of the five bills studied, there are two instances of the
conference committee in fact writing new language into the bill
under consideration. The first instance was in the 1951 act in
which the conferees went beyond the intent of the original floor
amendment of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.) and added a clause
which prohibited the importation of furs from the Communist bloc.
There was nothing in either the House or the Senate bill which
justified this change of Intent.
The second Instance of the conferees legislating directly
took place in the 1962 act. Here the committee took it upon itself
to grant the President a broad power to increase tariffs ’in the
national interest/' Similar amendments had been defeated in the
Senate, and nothing comparable can be found in the House bill.
With the exception of these two notable examples, the con-
ference committees studied here appear to have played their role
as ascribed by the formal rules of the Congress, namely the role
of consensus-making. This role, which is so definitely limited
in the formal rules, however, did not serve to prevent the extension
of authority when the conferees found a desire and a need for such
an extension.
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B. House Versus Senate In Conference
Another question which arises in studying conference coraait-
tees concerns the relative strength in conference of House and
Senate conferees. There have been a variety of opinions as to which
chamber holds the upper hand in the conference.
Roland Young has found that "the Senators are better bar-
gainers than the Representatives."*^ Bertram Gross is in basic
agreement with Young in the book The Legislative Struggle maintain-
ing that ’everything else being equal, the Senators are in a better
bargaining position.
. . On the other side of the question
Gilbert Steiner has found that in a variety of cases which he has
examined that the House has been the more influential chamber in
the conference by a two-to-onemargin.** ***
In the five cases examined here, we have seen the gradual
diminution of Senate control of conference committee action on trade
legislation, and the gradual assumption of this leadership by the
House conferees of the Ways and Means Committee. It is important
to note that after Congressman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.) assumed the
Chairmanship of the House Ways and Means Committee that the House
scored impressively in the conference committee action of 1958 and
1962 .
**Roland Young, This Is Congress (New York, 1946), p. 133.
^Gross, op. clt ., p. 324.
***Steiner, op. cit .. Chapter 12.
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After examining the 1951, 1953 and 1955 act., one would be
inclined to agree with Young In hi. contention that Senator, are In a
better bargaining position. In the 1951 and 1955 bill., the Senate
conferee, achieved definite advantages for their chamber. In the
much less controversial bill of 1953, the Senate still held the edge
in conference results. There is reason to believe that the Senate
conferees often have a more definite mandate from their chamber as
Senators can vote on all amendments presented by their colleague,
while "closed rules" in the House prevent votes by the entire House
of Representatives on the controversial items within a specific bill.
A powerful individual who has achieved the prestige of Mr.
Mills can easily counteract the supposed strategic advantage of the
Senate, however. There is reason to believe that Senator Byrd has
lost touch with his committee over the years and that one result of
this, at least with respect to recent trade legislation, has been an
intensified struggle for power in the Finance Committee. At the
same time it appears that Mr. Mills has maintained firm control
over the Ways and Means Committee, at least in the field of recip-
rocal trade. This seems to strongly support the theory that Mr.
Mills' dominance of this conference group was mainly responsible for
the substantial House victories of 1958 and 1962.
C. Individual Conferees
Due to the number of personalities involved and the secret
nature of conference action, it is quite difficult to evaluate the
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importance of individual members of conference committees. It should
be said, however, that every indication is that individuals can and
do play a major role in determining final conference results.
An example of this can be seen if one accepts the reliabil-
ity of the inside sources of John Morris of the New York Tim^a con-
cerning the 1958 act. It was apparent when conference action began
that Senate conferees wanted to discard the Congressional veto amend-
ment which had been inserted in the House bill. Similar amendments
had been decisively defeated in the Senate, and Chairman Byrd and
the Republican minority had voted against any such Congressional veto
of Presidential decisions.
Yet Representative Forand (D-R.I.) was able to unite with the
two Republican ultra-protectionists (Reed and Simpson) in forcing
Senate acceptance of their amendment, which Forand had sponsored in
the Hays and Means Committee. It is apparent that both Representa-
tive Mills and Representative Gregory were more than willing to ex-
clude this House amendment, and it is also apparent that the Admin-
istration was not overly happy with the amendment. Yet Forand was
able to upset what seems to have been the opinion of the majority of
the Democrats in the House and was able to see that the Congressional
veto was kept in the bill by threatening to join with these same two
Republicans on other issues crucial to the content of the bill. The
maneuver to kill undesirable amendments by conference action rather
than by floor action had proved quite unsuccessful.
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Referring to Figures 9 and 10, one notes that certain Indi-
viduals have had a long-standing position In conference comnittee
deliberations on reciprocal trade legislation. In Figure 9 ve note
that six Representatives have been members of at least three of the
five conferences in point. These six include three Democrats:
Cooper, Dingell and Mills; and three Republicans: Reed, Jenkins
and Simpson. The 1962 House conferees included six new conferees
on trade legislation. This may well account in part for the power
of the veteran Representative Mills, who appeared on four of the
five conference committees in question and whose fellow conferees
were practically without experience in conference committee procedure
on reciprocal trade legislation. It should also be noted that Mr.
Mills had become known as "the expert" on taxing legislation in the
House of Representatives by this time.
Figure 10 shows a greater spread in the representation of
Senate conferees, with only four men (Byrd, Kerr, Mllllkln and
Martin) having actively participated in three or more conferences on
reciprocal trade legislation. Unlike the steady increase of influ-
ence in the case of Mr. Mills, we see that by 1962, Chairman Byrd
had lost most of his influence in conference and had turned Finance
committee leadership over to the powerful Senator Robert Kerr
(D-Okla.). It is also interesting to note the changes in attitudes
of Senators Byrd and Kerr over the years, the former tending
tewarc.
a much more conservative position on reciprocal trade while
the
latter changed from a more conservative to a more liberal
position
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on the same type of legislation. This seems to be rather atypical
of the average conference committee member, as the average conferee
is high in seniority and is usually felt to have developed a highly
polarized position on long-standing issues such as reciprocal trade
legislation.
D. Conference Representation
For many years many people have been displeased with many of
the decisions which conference committees have made. In Chapter I,
I took note of the Clark resolution of 1958 which would have required
a majority of Senate conferees to be in basic agreement with the
Senate version of a bill which they would take to conference.
It is apparent here that in many instances, through examining
records or through examining conference results, that conferees were
not in accord with a majority of their chamber or with a majority of
their party in that chamber.
In 1951 it was evident that House conferees did not represent
the majority wishes of their chamber in the final conference results.
Due to an absence of roll calls it is difficult to pin the responsi-
bility on any one conferee, but it is apparent that the Democratic
conferees did not represent the majority opinion of House Democrats
in the final analysis.
In 1955 it is quite apparent from examining Figure 3 that
Senator Kerr was not at all in agreement with the majority of all
Senators or with a majority of Democrats on reciprocal trade, for he
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was one of only six Democrats who voted against final passage of the
1955 act. Likewise an examination of Figure 4 shows that Republican
Representatives Jenkins and Simpson represented the minority view
among Republican members of the House.
Likewise in 1958 Democratic Senators Kerr and Frear did not
agree with the majority in their house or their party. Also Republi-
can Representatives Reed and Simpson did not represent the majority
views of either all representatives or of Republican representatives.
The same holds true in 1962 for Senator Byrd.
The two outstanding examples, then, of misrepresentation are
the House Republicans and the Senate Democrats. In 1953, 1955, and
1958 House conferees were somewhat out of line with the feelings of
the majority of House Republicans in regard to reciprocal trade.
In 1955 and 1958 Senator Kerr, in 1958 Senator Frear, and in 1962
Senator Byrd were in complete disagreement with the majority of
Senate Democrats, which threatened seriously the chances of carrying
out the will of the majority. Evidently in 1951 at least one House
Democrat was guilty of misrepresenting the feelings of the House
though it is impossible to say which one from available information.
It would, therefore, seem that it is entirely justifiable for Senator
Clark to question the make-up of Senate conference committees.
A question can be raised here as to what "misrepresentation’
in conference committee really is. It can be asked if conference
committees must not, in fact, misrepresent one house or the other at
all times. To a great extent this criticism is a valid one.
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Conference committees are not expected by their chamber or by the
public to reach a solution which is exactly half way between both
the House and Senate bills.
The question here is actually one of degree and of purpose.
The following questions would seem to be applicable here.
1. Should the majority of conferees of each chamber be advo-
cates of the majority position within the chamber?
2. Should final conference results be expected, at least in most
cases, to reflect a compromise solution somewhere between the
version which each house has passed? If not, a conference
committee is not needed, for either house can accept the
version of the other chamber if it is willing to accede to
the changes made in a bill by the other chamber.
It would seem reasonable to assume that any solution to the
present dilemma involving conference committees will have to consider
these two points if the conference committee is to be made responsi-
ble for representing the views of a majority of the members of each
respective chamber.
E. Presidential-Legislative Relations
in Conference
As we have seen, there have been three distinct types of
executive-legislative party relationships in the five cases studied
here. In 1951 and 1962 the Democrats controlled both the Congress
and the Presidency, in 1953 the Republicans controlled both branches
90
of government, and in 1955 and 1958 there was a Democratic Congress
with a Republican President.
Yet final action on reciprocal trade legislation would seem
to indicate that party control of government is not always as simple
as having a majority in the two houses of Congress and control of the
presidency. In 1951 Congress overrode the wishes of President Truman
and passed trade restrictions which he opposed. Yet in 1955 when
President Eisenhower intervened in conference action to approve the
Senate version of the extension act, his wishes were honored despite
the fact that the Democrats controlled Congress.
In the three other cases studied here, the Presidential role
in conference decisions was negligible. In 1953 President Elsen-
hower took no public stand on the issue of the bl-partlsan trade com-
mission, though it was rumored that administration pressures even-
tually forced the House Republicans to capitulate in order to avoid
killing the bill in conference. In 1958 the wishes of President
Elsenhower were very uncertain, and it was doubtful that his influ-
ence played much of a part in conference results. In 1962 the primary
wish of President Kennedy, namely most-favored-nation preference for
Poland and Yugoslavia, was stricken in conference. From these
examples it does not appear that straight party control was a major
factor in determining these conference results, but that Presidential
relations with influential conferees was a major factor in these
results.
F. The Conference Committee System In Retrospect
It is apparent from this study that the role of the confer-
ence committee in the legislative system can be both an important
role and a controversial one. One of the primary findings of this
study, however, is the difficulty of researching the area of con-
ference committees. Researchers in the future will undoubtedly
present new insights into this unexplored area of the legislative
process, but their work will be hampered by the secrecy of confer-
ence proceedings, and their obstacles in discovering the truth will
be many in number.
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FIGURE 9
House Managers: Conference Committees: Trade Agreements ExtensionActs, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1958; Trade Expansion Act, 1962
Democrats 1951 1953 1955 1958 1962
Doughton (N.C.) 1
Cooper (Tenn.) 2 1 1
Dingell (Mich.) 3 2 2
Mills (Ark.) 4 . 3 l 1
Gregory (Ky.) 2
Forand (R.I.) (3)
King (Cal.) 2
Boggs (La.) 3
Keogh (N.Y.) 4
Republicans
Reed (N.Y.) (1) (1) • (1)
Jenkins (Ohio) (3) (2) (2)
Simpson (Pa.) (4) (3) (3) (3)
Mason (111.) (1)
Byrnes (Wis.) 2
Baker (Tenn.) 3
Numbers indicate rank on Ways and Means Committee during years
served as a conferee on reciprocal trade. Hyphen (-) indicates that
the man was a member of the Committee during a particular year but did
not serve as a manager for some reason, despite his seniority on the
Comnittee.
Plain numbers indicate that conferee was generally favorable
to the reciprocal trade legislation under consideration.
Numbers in parentheses indicate that the conferee was gener-
ally unfavorable to reciprocal trade legislation under consideration.
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FIGURE 10
Senate Managers: Conference Committees: Trade Agreements ExtensionActs, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1958; Trade Expansion Act, 1962
Democrats 1951 1953 1955 1958 1962
George (Ga.) 1 1 2*
Connally (Tex.) 2
Byrd (Va.) 3 2 1 1 (1)
2
Kerr (Okla.)
Frear (Del.)
Long (La.)
(3) (2)
(3)
3
Smathers (Fla.) 4a
Republicans
Millikln (Col.) <n* 1 (l)*
Taft (Ohio) (2)
Butler (Neb.) 2
Martin (Pa.) 3 (2)* 1
Williams (Del.) 2 <n*
Carlson (Kan.) (2)*b
Curtis (Neb.) (5)
*Indicates a Senator who supported the Idea of reciprocal
trade, but wished to have a number of restrictions added to the law
then under consideration.
Numbers Indicate rank on the Finance Committee during years
served as a conferee on reciprocal trade legislation.
Plain numbers indicate that the conferee was generally favor*
able to the reciprocal trade legislation under consideration.
Numbers In parentheses indicate that the conferee was gen-
erally unfavorable to the reciprocal trade legislation then under
" consideration.
aProxy in conference to Senator Harry F. Byrd (George, 1955;
Smathers, 1962).
bproxy in conference to Senator John Williams (Carlson,
1962).
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Chapters III-VII. For my Information on the specific trade legis-
lation, I have used a variety of source materials. These original
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